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In spite of its limited competence in the matter2, the EU has engaged in an ambitious 
struggle against lifestyle risks (tobacco, alcohol, diets, etc.)3 using its harmonisation 
powers under Article 114 TFEU concerning the internal market. While this objective 
may be laudable, it is also true that when the internal market objective completely 
disappears behind the public health objective, the EU faces an eminent constitutional 
problem. Indeed, the question of when the EU can, and cannot, use its broad 
harmonisation power under Article 114 TFEU4 has long agitated the European legal 
community, for it is a crucial element of the vertical repartition of competences 
between the Union and the Member States. The two cases dealt with in this case 
note are the CJEU’s most recent answer concerning this contentious matter.  
Almost two decades ago, amidst worries of competence creep on the basis of Article 
114 TFEU, the Court rendered its landmark judgement in the (in)famous Tobacco 
Advertising case5, where it decided that a harmonisation measure would only be 
considered as an improvement to the functioning or the establishment of the internal 
market, and therefore legitimately based on what is now Article 114 TFEU, if it 
“contributes to eliminating obstacles to the free movement of goods and to the 
freedom to provide services, and to removing distortions of competition”6. These 
distortions must be “appreciable”, otherwise the power of the EU would be 
“practically unlimited”7. 
The judgement was welcomed, and rightly so. A mere link between harmonisation 
measures and an economic activity would give the EU an almost blanket power to 
harmonise any given field of law, which is surely not what the “Masters of the 
Treaties” intended – and which would be incompatible with the fundamental 
constitutional principle of conferral. In accordance with this initial Tobacco ruling, 
internal market legislation can perfectly well pursue a public policy objective8, as long 
                                                          
1 Academic Assistant, European Legal Studies Department, College of Europe. 
2 Article 168 TFUE clearly states: “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, may also adopt incentive measures designed to protect and improve human 
health and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges, measures concerning 
monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health, and measures which 
have as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse of alcohol, 
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.” 
3 ALEMANNO A. and GARDE A., “The emergence of an EU lifestyle policy: the case if alcohol, tobacco 
and unhealthy diets”, Common Market Law Review, (2013), 1745-1786. 
4 Article 114 TFEU paragraph 1 provides: “Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following 
provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The European 
Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.” 
5 CJEC, 5 October 2000, Germany v European Parliament and Council, C-376/98, 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:544.  
6 Ibid., para. 106. 
7 Ibid., para. 107. 
8 See B. DE WITTE, “Non-market values in internal market legislation”, p. 73, in, N. SHUIBHNE (ed.), 
Regulating the Internal Market, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006, pp. 64-68; B. DE WITTE, “A 
  
as it effectively removes obstacles to trade or distortions of competition. The use of 
Article 114 TFEU would otherwise simply be an abuse of power. However, as has 
been noted by scholars,9 ever since its Tobacco judgement, the Court has been 
watering down its case law. The two cases at issue here, Poland v European 
Parliament and Council10 and Philip Morris11 are a perfect example of this regrettable 
trend.  
Both rulings deal with the validity of Directive 2014/4012 on tobacco products, in an 
action for annulment brought by Poland in the first case, and following a request for 
preliminary ruling in proceedings initiated by several tobacco manufacturers in the 
second case. Among other things, the applicants argued that Article 114 TFEU did 
not constitute an adequate legal basis for the adoption of the Directive. As will be 
discussed below, the Court answers by upholding the validity of the Directive despite, 
for some of its provisions, the sheer lack of evidence of any significant contribution to 
the free movement of goods. This is the case in at least two instances: the prohibition 
of tobacco products with a flavour and the minimum harmonisation of some of the 
packaging requirements. 
 
1. Prohibition of tobacco products with a flavour  
 
Directive 2014/40 prohibits “the placing on the market of tobacco products with a 
characterising flavour”13 on grounds that these “facilitate initiation of tobacco 
consumption or affect consumption patterns”14. The underlying reason for such a 
ban, as for any anti-tobacco legislation in general, is clear: to reduce the 
consumption of tobacco. In its previous judgement, Swedish Match15, the Court had 
already upheld this sort of bans under Article 114 TFEU, claiming that they did 
contribute to free movement. It is however puzzling. How can the prohibition of a 
product be considered as removing obstacles to trade? On the contrary, it seems to 
set up new obstacles. 
In both cases, the Court fails to provide a convincing answer to this question. It 
merely uses a circular reasoning by restating its previous case-law. It says that “in 
prohibiting the placing on the market of tobacco products with a characterising 
flavour”16, a general ban “guards precisely against such divergences in the rules of 
the Member States”17 and that “the elimination of the divergences between the 
national rules as regards the composition of tobacco products or the prevention of 
the development of divergences between them, including the prohibition, at EU level, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
competence to protect: the pursuit of non-market aims through internal market legislation”, in P. 
SYRPIS, The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, pp. 25-48. 
9 See WEATHERILL S., “The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: 
How the Court’s Case Law has become a “Drafting Guide””, German Law Journal, (2011), (12)3, pp. 
827-864; WYATT D., “Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market”, University of Oxford 
Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, (2007), Working Paper No 9/2007, pp. 1-46. 
10 ECJ, 4 May 2016, Poland v European Parliament and Council, C-358/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:323. 
11 ECJ, 4 May 2016, Philip Morris Brands SARL e.a. v Secretary of State for Health, C-547/14, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:325. 
12 Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 
2001/37/EC, (OJ 2014 L 127, p. 1). 
13 Directive 2014/40/EU, Article 7. 
14 Directive 2014/40/EU, Recital 15. 
15 CJEC, 14 December 2004, Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of State for 
Health, C-210/03, ECLI:EU:C:2004:802. 




of certain additives, seeks to facilitate the smooth functioning of the internal market in 
the products concerned”18. 
In his Swedish Match Opinion, Advocate General Geelhoed defended the ban on 
tobacco for oral use, snus, by the diminution of enforcement costs: “In short, if snus 
is not on the market of the European Union, the effort to control the marketing of 
other smokeless tobacco products can be reduced. In this respect, one can say that 
Article 8 of the 2001 Directive contributes to the removal of barriers to trade in other 
products.” 19 However, the link between lowering the costs of public authorities’ 
missions and removing barriers to trade is far from obvious. Which barriers are being 
removed? Why would the reduction in enforcement costs increase the trade in other 
products? This seems far-fetched, to say the least. 
In Philip Morris, Advocate General Kokott brings forward another argument to justify 
the prohibition of flavoured tobacco products contained in Directive 2014/40/EC: 
 
 “Undoubtedly, the prohibition on tobacco products with characterising flavours 
 is not capable of improving the functioning of the internal market for those 
 products. However, it is recognised in case-law that Article 114 TFEU confers 
 on the Union legislature the power to prohibit the placing on the market of a 
 certain product in the entire European internal market if this helps to improve 
 trading conditions for a class of other products. 
 The prohibition under EU law of certain delivery forms of tobacco serves to 
 create uniform trade conditions for all tobacco products throughout the 
 European Union. Thus, the Union-wide prohibition on tobacco products that 
 are mixed with a characterising flavour is, as it were, the price for the free 
 circulation in the European internal market of ‘normal’ tobacco products which 
 comply with the conditions laid down by the Directive, whilst at the same time 
 ensuring a high level of health protection. In other words, tobacco products 
 may in principle still be placed on the market in the European Union, but only 
 without characterising flavours.”20 
 
In the second paragraph, Advocate General Kokott seems to consider normal 
tobacco products and flavoured tobacco products as one sole category of products 
whose trading conditions would be harmonised and hence whose trade would be 
facilitated by the ban. This seems first of all to be in contradiction with the first 
paragraph, where she mentions ‘other’ products. It is, most importantly, a bold 
statement, as it is easy to imagine that someone smoking a menthol cigarette would 
not necessarily divert to the ‘normal’ one after the former type having been banned. 
And it is to be also noted that the Court considered the limitation of the consumption 
of tobacco arising from the ban on flavoured products as one of the main reason for 
adopting it21. This goes against the idea of a substitutability of flavoured and non-
flavoured tobacco products and against the very logic of banning one kind of 
products to facilitate trade in others. Moreover, Advocate General Kokott’s 
assumption and the Court’s ruling are not based on any economic evidence 
regarding the effect of the ban on trade in other products. 
The justification for a total ban under Article 114 TFEU appears to be lacking: “The 
Community has no legitimate interest in the banning of free standing products. […] 
Action at the Community level makes no contribution to the internal market in fact; it 
                                                          
18 Poland v European Parliament and Council, supra note 6, para. 64.; Philipp Morris, supra note 11, 
para. 125. 
19 Joined Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed, 7 September 2004, Swedish Match and Arnold 
André, ECLI:EU:C:2004:487, para 79.  
20 Opinion of Mrs. Advocate General Kokott, 23 December 2015, Philip Morris Brands SARL and 
Others, Case C-547/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:853, para. 82-83, (emphasis added). 
21 Poland v European Parliament and Council, supra note 10, para. 42. 
  
simply asserts Community competence for the sake of an abstract principle; the 
principle that in a single market it is central authority which decides which products or 
services may be placed on that market. ”22 
This is not to say that a prohibition can never be legitimate from a market point of 
view. This could be the case when a measure sets requirements for a product, 
prohibiting the commerce of products that do not comply with it, while authorizing the 
trade of products that do comply with it23. In this case, the measure does create a 
market for authorized products and does remove obstacles to trade. 
 
2. Minimum harmonisation of packaging requirements  
 
Even if it does not appear as problematic as a total ban on a product, minimum 
harmonisation also raises some questions as to its contribution to the removal of 
barriers to trade. In Tobacco Advertising, the Court motivated its decision partly by 
the failure of the Directive to ensure the free movement of products in conformity with 
its provisions, while allowing Member States to impose to these products more 
stringent requirement, thereby barring access to their market for products originating 
from other Member States24. In subsequent cases, such as British American 
Tobacco25, where the legislator did include a free movement clause in its Directive 
ensuring that compliant products could not be refused because of stricter national 
requirements, the Court upheld the measure. But it is not the only problem caused by 
minimum harmonization.  
In the present case, the Directive regulates the size of health warnings26, the shape 
of the package and the number of cigarettes contained27. The rest of the packaging is 
not harmonized and the Directive also imposes that health warnings are displayed in 
the official language of each Member State in which it is marketed28. Ultimately, it 
remains possible that despite these harmonisation measures, producers would still 
have to manufacture packages for twenty-eight separate markets with different 
requirements for each of them. Here, the risk of diverging national rules makes the 
contribution to free movement purely hypothetical. 
The Court answers to this argument rather scantly: “Whilst it is true that some 
provisions of Chapter II of Title II of Directive 2014/40 require that certain elements of 
the labelling and packaging of tobacco products are adapted to take account of, 
amongst other things, the official language(s) or the tax legislation of the Member 
State of marketing, the fact remains that the directive harmonises other elements of 
the labelling and packaging of those products, such as the shape of the unit packets, 
the minimum number of cigarettes per unit packet and the size and combined nature 
of health warnings. As the Advocate General has observed in point 98 of her 
Opinion, those measures thus contribute to the removal of obstacles to trade, since 
they allow the undertakings concerned to reduce costs through economies of 
scale.”29 
                                                          
22 D. WYATT, supra note 9, p. 28. 
23 See Ibid., p. 25: “As noted above, the rationale of withdrawal from the market of non-compliant 
products is to enforce application of the relevant safety standard, and contribute to the elimination of 
disparities between national rules and their application, and thereby to the free movement of goods 
between the Member States. Prohibiting non-compliant products as a means of enforcement of a safety 
standard application of which facilitates the free movement of compliant products is quite different from 
prohibition outright of a product.” 
24 Germany v European Parliament and Council, supra note 5, para. 103-105. 
25 CJEC, 10 December 2002, The Queen contre Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American 
Tobacco (Investments) Ltd et Imperial Tobacco Ltd, C-491/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:741. 
26 Directive 2014/40, Article 9. 
27 Directive 2014/40, Article 13. 
28 Directive 2014/40, Article 8. 
29 Philipp Morris, supra note 11, para. 103. 
  
As Advocate General Kokott puts it: “such partial harmonisation also undeniably 
offers advantages for the functioning of the internal market, since whilst it does not 
eliminate all obstacles to trade, it does eliminate some. In the present case, this 
means, for example, that manufacturers of tobacco products throughout the internal 
market are able to use cigarette packets which have a uniform basic design and are 
required to adapt that design to the specificities of their respective national laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions only in certain details (colours, for 
example), but no longer in every respect.”30  
In short, she acknowledges the fact that products may still need to adopt different 
standards, but not in every aspect of the packaging. Does it effectively facilitate 
trade? Would the costs of compliance with various national rules diminish if the 
packages had a similar design but were to be produced in different colours, with 
different sizes of health warnings and in different languages? Again, this is far from 
self-evident and some clarification by the legislator would be much welcome. The 
recent introduction of plain packaging in some EU Member States is a rather good 
illustration of the limited harmonization power of the Directive and the hypothetical 
aspect of its benefits to trade.  
Stephen Weatherill writes that “minimum harmonization might be rejected in 
particular cases for political or economic reasons but it cannot be rejected for clear 
and generally applicable constitutional reasons.”31. This is certainly true. But when 
the facts of the case make contribution to free movement merely hypothetical, the 
Court should not uphold such a measure without more quantitative elements being 




In her Opinion in Philip Morris, Advocate General Kokott writes that “the suitability of 
Article 114 TFEU (formerly Article 95 EC and Article 100a of the EEC Treaty) as a 
legal basis no longer plays the central role it did in earlier years, even though certain 
points of detail continue to be disputed.”32 It is undoubtedly true. Whether it is 
because the Court has managed to strike the right balance between market 
integration and national autonomy remains to be seen. Poland v European 
Parliament and Council and Philipp Morris do not point in that direction. 
Fighting tobacco or alcoholism is a noble cause. But health policy, especially when 
regulating lifestyles, also expresses communities’ preferences and political diversity. 
It is probably why the Union was not given an extensive power in this field and why 
the Court, while preserving the necessary objective of market integration, should 
monitor the EU legislator more carefully. Fundamentally, these cases highlight a 
more fundamental issue: can ‘social’ policies always effectively be pursued by the 
use of market legislation? This note has sought to provide a, partial, negative answer 






                                                          
30 Opinion of Mrs. Advocate General Kokott, Philip Morris, supra note 20, para. 119, (emphasis added). 
31 S. WEATHERILL, The Internal Market as a Legal Concept, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 
215. 




European Legal Studies 






1/2017, Cecilia Rizcallah, “European and International Criminal Cooperation: A 
Matter of Trust? CJEU (Grand Chamber), Aranyosi and Căldăraru, 5 April 2016, 
Joined Cases C 404/15 and C 659/15 PPU - CJEU (Grand Chamber), Petruhhin, 6 
September 2016, Case C-182/5”. 
 
2/2017, Vincent Delhomme, “Internal Market as an Excuse: The Case of EU Anti-
Tobacco Legislation. ECJ, 4 May 2016, Philip Morris Brands SARL e.a. v Secretary 
of State for Health, C-547/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:325. ECJ, 4 May 2016, Poland v 
European Parliament and Council, C-358/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:323.  
 
